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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) is envisioned to digitize the
physical world, resulting in a digital representation of our
proximate living space. The possibility of inferring privacy
violating information from IoT data necessitates adequate
security measures regarding data storage and communica-
tion. To address these privacy and security concerns, we
introduce our system that stores IoT data securely in the
Cloud database while still allowing query processing over
the encrypted data. We enable this by encrypting IoT data
with a set of cryptographic schemes such as order-preserving
and partially homomorphic encryptions. To achieve this on
resource-limited devices, our system relies on optimized al-
gorithms that accelerate partial homomorphic and order-
preserving encryptions by 1 to 2 orders of magnitude. Our
early results show the feasibility of our system on low-power
devices. We envision our system as an enabler of secure IoT
applications.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General
– Security and Protection
Keywords
Data Security, Internet of Things, System Design, Comput-
ing on Encrypted Data
1. INTRODUCTION
IoT devices are physically integrated in our living space,
and hence, deal with sensitive and private data that could be
misused to infer privacy violating information. End-to-End
secure communication is a necessary measure for the secure
IoT. However, it protects merely the communication against
unauthorized entities (e.g., eavesdropping, and modification
attacks) and leaves the data unprotected on the Cloud. Stor-
ing data in such form leaves it vulnerable to breaches [8],
caused by hackers and curious administrators [1].
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Figure 1: Our system enables protection of IoT data
at personal devices, either at IP-enabled IoT devices
or at the personal gateway, such as the smartphone.
The Cloud database has no access to the encryption
keys, but is able to process queries over encrypted
data. All keys are derived from a master secret held
by the user.
IoT Devices. The asymmetry of available resources in
terms of bandwidth, computation, and energy within dif-
ferent entities of the IoT (e.g., constraint IoT devices, mo-
bile devices, and powerful Cloud) necessitates a careful de-
sign of security solutions that advocate protection of data
at personal devices. As illustrated in Figure 1, we distin-
guish between two main classes of constrained IoT devices:
a) IP-enabled, and b) short-range wireless devices such as
wearables that rely on a personal gateway (e.g., smartphone)
for IP communication. Accommodating the logic and cryp-
tographic algorithms for securing IoT data on IoT devices
or the personal gateways, brings the challenge of designing
an e cient system with regards to the limited resources, yet
not compromising security nor quality of experience.
Encrypted Query Processing. An intuitive approach to
counter attacks on IoT data is to store data encrypted on
the Cloud database, with data en-/decryption performed at
the user-side. This, however, is impractical, as it prevents
any server-side query processing and results into undesirable
application delays. To overcome this limitation, several en-
crypted query processing approaches [9, 10, 4, 3] have been
introduced in the recent years. These approaches utilize
cryptographic techniques (e.g., order-preserving encryption
and partial homomorphic encryption) that allow computa-
tions to be carried out on encrypted data.
CryptDB [9] is one of the first systems that integrates
e cient encrypted query processing into database manage-
ment systems. In CryptDB, the Cloud performs traditional
database queries over encrypted data and replies with the
encrypted result. This is realized using a trusted proxy that
intercepts the communication and applies en-/decryption
(see Figure 2). CryptDB is designed with web applications
in mind and is not suitable for IoT application scenarios,
mainly because: (i) it employs cryptographic schemes that
are prohibitively expensive for constrained devices and (ii) it
relies on a trusted proxy, which implies no protection be-
tween proxy and the application server.
Encrypted Query Processing for the IoT. In this pa-
per, we present our IoT data protection system which se-
curely stores encrypted IoT data on the Cloud database,
while allowing for e cient database query processing over
encrypted data. In our design, we move away from a mere
web application communication paradigm. Instead, we de-
sign a secure E2E system that stores encrypted data from
personal devices on a Cloud database, and where data pro-
tection is executed at the personal device (see Figure 2).
Thus, we dispense the role of a trusted proxy on the path
that has access to all keying material. This allows us to ad-
dress a stronger threat model, as the keying material does
not leave user’s personal devices.
To motivate the use case of our system, let us consider
the application scenario of a health monitoring device sim-
ilar to Fitbit Tracker (provided as built-in app on modern
smartphones) which logs heart rate, location, and times-
tamps. The heart rate measurements can be used to infer
sensitive information about a person, such as stress, depres-
sion, and heart-related diseases. Hence, heart rate informa-
tion should be protected from untrusted parties. To still
allow certain computations, e.g., average over the protected
heart rate data, we utilize additive homomorphic encryp-
tion. The location is potentially also sensitive. Thus, we
apply deterministic encryption, allowing encrypted queries
correlating heart rate with location. Finally, the timestamps
could be encrypted with order-preserving encryption, to al-
low searches in specified time-frames.
2. RELATEDWORK
Related work to our approach can be grouped into two
main categories.
Privacy-Preserving Cryptography. There has been a
significant amount of work on cryptographic schemes [7,
12, 2, 3] that could be utilized in privacy-preserving compu-
tation. Gentry’s work [5] depicts a breakthrough, showing
a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. Since then,
his work has been incrementally enhanced up to 6 orders of
magnitudes by the research community [6]. Prior to Gen-
try’s work, the focus was on partial homomorphic encryp-
tion, where only one type of computation such as multipli-
cation or addition is supported [3].
Although FHE provides semantic security and supports at
the same time arbitrary computations over encrypted data,
it is not yet best suited for encrypted query processing. This
is due to both its prohibitive cost and the fact that the Cloud
must process all existing data in database for queries such
as equality check or comparison.
Computation on Encrypted Data. Perrig et al. [4] in-
troduced an e cient search over encrypted text files. This
is achieved by deterministically encrypting metadata of files
which are themselves encrypted using strong encryption, i.e.,
probabilistic. Perrig et al.’s e↵orts paved the way for more
advanced systems enabling encrypted query processing [9,
10] (just to mention a few). CryptDB [9], as detailed in §1,
realizes the encrypted query processing for web applications
by means of a trusted proxy intercepting and modifying the
communication before the database. Mylar [10] introduces
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Figure 2: Our system extends CryptDB [9] to secure
IoT data. It supersedes a trusted proxy with access
to all keys. Instead, data protection is performed at
IoT devices or user devices.
a multi-key searchable encryption scheme, exemplified by
smartphone apps. Mylar protects the content of the docu-
ments and the searched words from the untrusted server.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We consider three main parties in our system: IoT de-
vices, the users, and the Cloud. We embrace the trend in
the IoT to store collected data in the Cloud. Hence, our
system is suitable for applications which store sensor data
in the Cloud for client-side processing. Such applications
can either upload the data directly to the Cloud (e.g., smart
appliances), or by means of a personal gateway such as the
smartphone (e.g., wearables). Our system consists of the
following components:
a) Crypto Engine for Constrained Devices. We de-
sign and implement the cryptographic algorithms required
to protect data on IoT devices with attention to e cient per-
formance, small memory footprint, and reasonable energy
consumption. Our targeted constrained device platforms are
equipped with similar resources as today’s typical IoT de-
vices, such as FitBit (e.g., System-on-Chip ARM Cortex-M
family with Bluetooth Low Energy or IEEE 802.15.4).
b) Client-side Library. We exemplify the client’s per-
sonal gateway with a smartphone. Our library enables se-
cure storage and interaction with the Cloud. It provides
the data protection services to local applications and exter-
nal devices, such as heath monitoring systems. It manages
the keying material and performs en-/decryption operations
within a reasonable time, so that the user’s experience re-
mains unchanged while interacting with the Cloud.
c) User Defined Functions for Databases. In our sys-
tem, the database remains unchanged and is only extended
with new functionality. This is possible with User Defined
Functions (UDFs). While computing over encrypted data,
the corresponding UDF is executed. For instance, the UDF
for an ordering-related query (e.g., order by, MAX, MIN) is
aware of the order-preserving encryption and computes the
result without access to the plaintext values.
Encrypted Data Processing. Utilization of encrypted
data processing is dependent on the application scenario and
security requirements. One of the main challenges in our
system is identifying lightweight cryptographic algorithms.
Then in contrast to current approaches [9, 10] which rely on
full-fledged machines for cryptographic operations, in our
system such operations are performed on constrained IoT
or/and end-user devices. Considering the set of encryption
schemes to support most of queries over encrypted data,
additive homomorphic encryption and order-preserving en-
cryption are the most computation-intensive ones. In our
system, we explore alternative lightweight cryptographic
Figure 3: Additive homomorphic encryption by
means of Paillier utilizing the cryptographic hard-
ware accelerator (HW) of our IoT device (Open-
Mote). Paillier’s plaintext-size can be as large as
the key size, in our case 1024 bit.
algorithms which provide the same level of security, but ex-
hibit significantly lower computation requirements. With
the EC-ElGamal and mutable order-preserving encoding
(mOPE) [11], we find alternatives for additive homomorphic
encryption and order-preserving encryption, respectively.
However, before being able to utilize them in our system
we have to address two issues: (i) deterministic mapping
of plaintext values to elliptic curve points for EC-ElGamal,
and (ii) increased communication overhead of mOPE in fa-
vor of lower computations. We address the former with el-
liptic curve point multiplication (P = mG) of the plain-
text m with a known elliptic curve point G. For mapping
back, a bounded Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithmic Prob-
lem (ECDLP) by means of the Baby-Step-Giant-Step algo-
rithm is solved. The latter can be optimized with K-ary
trees to reduce the interactions-rounds [11].
Extendibility. In our design, we show the potential and
feasibility of encrypted query processing for the IoT. Al-
though we focus on a subset of encryption schemes that sup-
port queries that are widely used in IoT data processing, our
design can be extended to include more advanced, however
carefully optimized, encrypted data processing schemes.
4. INITIAL RESULTS
We are prototyping our system consisting of three main
components: (i) the IoT component is being implemented
for OpenMotes1, (ii) the gateway component for Google
Nexus 5, an (iii) the Cloud database component is an ex-
tended implementation of CryptDB [9].
Our early results of additive homomorphic encryption by
means of EC-ElGamal as compared to the Paillier cryptosys-
tem indicate a performance improvement by 1 order of mag-
nitude. As shown in Figure 3, Paillier’s encryption takes 1.6
to 3.1 s, depending on the plaintext-size. With EC-ElGamal,
we have a constant encryption time of 210 ms, including our
plaintext to elliptic curve mapping.
Note the decryption process in EC-ElGamal, specifically
due to computation of an ECDLP, is computationally more
intensive than the encryption. This is not an issue, since the
decryption is performed on the more powerful user device.
In our early results of EC-ElGamal, decryption on Google
Nexus 5 takes about 190 ms and requires 45 Mbyte of mem-
ory. We intend to reduce this value further with an improved
implementation of the Baby-Step-Giant-Step algorithm.
1OpenMote platform, 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 microcon-
troller, 32 MHz CPU, 802.15.4 radio: www.openmote.com
Figure 4: Memory-computation tradeo↵ in the
Baby-Step-Giant-Step algorithm on a Google Nexus
5. Our system stores a pre-computed look-up table
of 45 MByte and solves an ECDLP for a 32-bit value
in maximum 190 ms.
5. FUTUREWORK
We introduced a secure system that provides strong com-
munication and data security for privacy-
preserving IoT applications. Our system leverages and tai-
lors cryptographic primitives that allow computation on en-
crypted data without disclosing decryption keys to the Cloud.
In this paper, we show the feasibly of our system and dis-
cuss initial results. We will show the practically and perfor-
mance of our system through an enhanced prototype imple-
mentation and thorough evaluation considering both micro-
benchmarking and system performance. We quantify the
overhead of our system in terms of energy, computation,
and latency. Moreover, we show the benefits of our system
with a case-study discussion.
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